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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
JOHN POTTER, DAVID B. POTTER,
JENNIE I. POTTER, SAR,AH
POTTER GIBBS, NETTIE POTTER
MILE~, MAY PO'r'r~H S'l'EvV A.H1',
EDI1'H POT'rER DEWEY,
Plaintiff~ and Respondent8.,
DR. W. H. GROVES LATTER-DAY
RAINTS HOSPITAL, a Corporation,
Defend~nt and Appellant,

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT
This action was brought by the sole heirs of
Jean Brown Potter, deceased, to recover damages
for the death of their wife and mother while a
'Patient at the hospital operated by appellant. The
deceased, while a patient at the hospital, suffered
a fall which broke her hip, and which caused her
death shortly thereafter. It has been and is respondents' theory that the fall was the result of
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the appellant hospital's negligence in failing to
properly guard deceased at a time when they knew
or should have known the patient needed restraint.
This theory is pleaded in Baragraphs 6 and 7 of the
complaint (Tr. 2-3; Ab. 3-4) and stated in counsel's
1
opening statement to the jury. (Tr. 21-23). Judgment was entered in favor of respondents and
against the appellant hospital upon the verdict in
the sum of $1,000.00 returned by the jury.

ARGUMENT
Appellant's 12th Assignment of Error and
grounds 3, 4, 9 and 10 of their 13th Assignment
question the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a finding of negligence against the hospital.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE
We submit that the evidence is more than ample
in this regard. Mrs. Potter, the deceased, entered
the hospital upon Febn1ary 16, 1939, suffered her
fall upon February 20th and died upon February
23rd. Prior to her fall she had been a very nerv:ous, restless patient. . At times she had been irrational and out of her head, talking aimlessly and
incoherently. Apparently the patient did not, upon
occasion, know she was in a hospital at all. The
daughter, Jennie, testified (Tr. 107; Ah. 17-18) in
regard to her mother's mental condition:
'·'She Would tell us: 'See, this beautiful
new room in the hotel they moved me in.'
The next time she would say, 'Oh, I don't
like this room in this. hotel.' Then she
would change her mind about it. One day
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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she was talking to 1ne, and then she started
to laugh. She said, 'Oh, I thought we were
down in Kress' shopping.' ''
1\Irs. Potter's condition was well known to the
appellant hospital, for the Clinical Record (Exhibit A) shows the patient to be upon February
17th "verv restless." This record for February
18th includes notations by the nurse on duty, that
the patient's "mind is much confused," that the
patient was ''talking incoherently,'' that she was
"very restless," that she was "irrational." Februarv 19th shows these notations bv the nurses:
''Extreme restlessness,'' •' still ve;.y restless,' •
''patient is irrational," "very noisy and restless."
February 20th reports the patient to be ''very much
confused'' and her ''condition unchanged.''
The Clinical Hecord also shows that the patient
did from time to time try to get out of bed. This
Record for February 18th shows that the patient
was "very restless- trying to get out of tent;"
and during the night "irrational, tries to get
out of bed." Upon the next day, February
19th, the day before her fall, the Clinical Record
shows that the patient succeeded in getting out of
bed. The record notation shows: ''Patient out of
bed.''
vVe submit that it takes no expert to draw the
conclusion that a patient who is "irrational'' and
"very much confused,'' and who "tries to get out
of bed'' and who does get ''out of bed,'' needs to
be watched or guarded. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota, speaking in a case involving a pneummlia patient who, during a temporary delirium,
frll or jumped from a hospital window, states:
"\iVhen a patient enters a hospital, knowing that the nu1nber of nurses is less than
1
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the number of patients, he may not ·expect
constant attendance, but the patient is entitled to such reasonable attention as his
safety may require. (Citing authorities).
If the patient is temporarily bereft of
reason, and is known by the hospital authorities to be in danger of self-destruction,
the authorities are in duty bound to use
reasonable care to prevent such an act.''
Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, etc., 175 Northwestern 699.
And in the instant case Mrs. Potter was watched
and guarded until the night of her fall. Upon h,er
admission to the hospital, upon the night of February 16th, sideboards were placed upon her bed by
the hospital. (Tr. 230; Clinical Record, Feb. 16).
Upon the nights of February 17th, 18th and 19th
a special nurse employed by the Potter family was
in constant attendance to the deceased. ( Tr. 102;
Ab. 17) . But upon the night of February 20ih no
sideboards were in place and, at the suggestion of
Rhoda Larsen, Supervisor of Nurses at the appellant hospital, the services of the special nurse were
dispensed with. Miss Larsen testified that she told
members of the Potter family:
"I told them, as far as their mother's condition was concerned and the treatment she
had to have could very easily be taken care
of by the floor nurses." (Tr. 233; Ab. 50).
It was upon this night, while totally unguarded,
that Mrs. Potter .suffered her fall, breaking her hip.
Pneumonia set in almost immediately and she died
upon February 23rd.
We repeat, that under these facts, it takes no
expert to draw the conclw;;ion that Mrs. Potter
should haYP be,en guarded in some manner. But
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such testimony is helpful, and appears in the record.
Miss Leona Felix, a witness for the appellant hospital upon direct examination, in response to a
question put by counsel for the hospital as to why
she had placed a sideboard on Mrs. Potter's bed
after the fall, answered in these words :

Q. "And "·hy did you put the board on at
all~

A. Well, it just seems like anything- any
nurse would 'think, ,after g-etting· out, if
they got out once, they would try it again ..

Q. And that was the reason for putting
it on J?
A. Yes." {Tr. 284; inaccurately stated
in Ab. 61).

It will be remembered that prior to her fall
Mrs. Potter had tried to get, and had been, out of
bed upon several occasions. ''Any nurse ~would
think, after getting out, if they got out once, they
would try it again." This was the opinion of the
appellant hospital's own expert.
Compliance or 'non-compliance with the customary methods in hospitals does not furnish a
controlling te·st of negligence.
1

''The generally accepted view is that customary methods or 1conduct do not furnish
a test which is conclusive or controlling
on the question of negligence, or fix .a standard by which negligence is to be guaged.
The standard of due care~ is such care as
a prudent person would exercise under the
circumstances of the particular case, and
conformity to customary or usual conduct
or methods cannot amount to more than a
circumstance of the case in determining
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whether due care ha.s been exercised. Accordingly, if the conduct pursued or the
methods adopted in the particular case do
not measure 'Up to the ordinary care which
would he exercised by a prudent person
under the circumstances, negligence may
he found to exi~t notwithstanding such conduct or methods were in accordance with
those customarily pursued or adopted. The
reason lis that the usual mode of doing a
particular thing may involve a lack of
proper care . . . . . ''
45 Corpus Juris 707, et seq. See also,
Jenkins rv. Hooper Irr. Co. 13 Utah 100;
44 Pac. 829.
We submit that there was verv satisfactorv
evidence of !negligence upon the pa~t of the ho; ·
pital.

_\PPELLANT'S FAILURE TO PROPERIJY
GUARD MRS. POTTER WAS 'l'HE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HER DEATH.
It is not denied by •appellant upon this appeal
that Mrs. Botter died as a result of the iJ!.juries shl:'
sustained in the fall occurring upon February 20th.
However, under the heading of proximate cause,
appellant in their 13th Assignment, grounds 5, 6,
7 and 8, state that there is no evidence in the record to show that even though the hospital had used
ordinary care in the nursing of the deceased, still
it would have been physically possible for the accident to have happened. To have offered evidence
to negative this proposition would have been
unique under the law of nPgligence. For example,
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a mail is struck and killed by a railroad train running at excessive speed and without ligfuts. Having proved that the active negligence of the railroad caused the deceased's death, would it be
necessary to show that had the train been going
slow and had been burning lights the accident would
not have happened·? Emphatically not, although it
is physically possible for a person to be killed by
a slow moving, fully lighted train.
And in the case at bar, although it is possible
for any person in a bed to fall out and suffer injuries, still it is the most reasonable of all assumptions that had the deceased been properly guarded
she would not have so fallen. E~xperience has
tanght the layman that a fall from bed is an unusual occurrence and one that does not happen in
th(; course of ordinary events. But every father
and ey·ery n1other knows that small children are
in danger of falling from bed and that cribs have
guards (sideboards) to prevent such an occurrence.
And every nurse knows that an irrational person
trying to get out of bed is apt to £all and should be
restrained. The testimony of the witness Felix,
above quoted, bears this out.
THE DECEASED'S CRITICAL CONDITION
UPON HER ADMISSION TO THE HOSPITAL DOES NOT RELIEVE THE HOSPITAL OF ANY DUTY TO PROPERLY
TREAT~ BUT ON THE CONTRARIY INCREASES THE DEHREE OF CARE DUE
THE PATIFJNT.
The examination of Mrs. Potter upon her admission to the hospital revealed her to be a serious}~· ill patient but tha.t with proper treatment her
condition could be improved. (Tr. 280; Ab. 60).
Her critical condition most certainly did not relieve
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the hospital from any duty it owed the patient. Such
a cruel rule would shame the law. This patient's
physical condition and her advanced a~e required
the hospital to exercise additional caution and vigilance in treating her.
45 Corpus Juris, 701.

THE EVIDE,NCE IS OVERWHELMING THAT
THE DECEASED FELL OUT OF BED.
Appellant's first and second grounds of their
13th Assignment and their 22nd Assignunent claim
there was no evidence to show deceased fell out of
bed. Sufficient answer to this claim is to quote
from the record without further comment.
The Clinical Record for February 21st at
12 :20 A. ~L shows :
''Talking- patient sitting on edge of bed
with legs down - reached for the floor fell as nurse entered the room. Complains
left hip paining - helped back to bed.
Crying and complaining of pain.''
Dr. tT ohn Boorne, the examining physician of
the hospital, in his report of the acCident (first
page of Exhibit A. the Statistical and Summary
Sheet), reports the accident thus:
''Fell out of bed and broke hip.
after died of pneumonia.''

Soon

In his direct testimony Dr. Boorne made this
-;tatement:

Q. "And what did you have in mind by
that description, 'fell out of bed~'
A. I merely meant that she - well, fell
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out of the bed on the floor.'' (Tr. 281 and
not appearing· in Appellant's Abs.tract).
And the "Titness Felix who witnessed the fall,
thought the deceased fell out of bed for she t(:\stified:
''After she fell out she was extren1ely
restless and she did move around a great
deal." (Tr. 28±; Ab. 61).
And Doctors Richards and Llewellyn, employees of the hospital, told l\Iiss Jennie Potter
that her mother had fallen out of bed for 'Miss
Potter testified:

Q. "Did they (the doctors) say at that
time anything about any injury to your
mother~

A. Yes, they told us about a fractured
hip from falling out of bed, and they said
they couldn't do anything." (Tr. 111~ Ab.
19).
Appellant's lOth Assignment complains of thf\
following question asked the witness, Jennie I.
Potter:

Q. ''What, if )anything, did you do by
way of special nurse after the injury to
your mother~'' (Tr. 115; Ab. 21).
By the great weight of authority medical expenses which have been paid by the beneficiaries
of a deceased person arising from the fatal injury
complained of are proper elements for recovery.

17 Corpus Juris, 1338-9.
However in this case we submit that this particular
question is moot, the trial court having not submitted this element of damage to the jury for con:-;ideration. (Instruction No. 9; Ab. 78), And we
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here call attention to the trial court's Instructions
Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 as fully presenting and submitting appellant's theory of the case to the jury contrary to appellant's contention in their 20th
Assignment.

UNDER THE UTAH WRONGFUL DEATH
STATUTE THE PECUNIARY VALUE OF
THE LOSS OF SOCIETY AND COM~
P ANIONSIDP AND LOS:S OFI SERVIC:b~S
OF THE DECEASED TO HER BENEFICIARIES IS A PROPER SUBJECT Ol!, INQUIRY AND ELEJ\ifENT OF DAMAGE.
The trial court in its Instruction No. 9 submitted to the jury the question of the pecuniary
loss, if any, sustained by the surviving husband
and children by way of loss of society and companionship caused by the death of the mother; also
the pecuniary loss, if any, sustained by the husband
only through loss of services. Such a charge i~:-t
proper and has long been the law of this State. In
Evans v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co.,
37 Utah 431; 108 Pac. 638,
this Court in upholding this proposition at page
437 states:
"'We think that, in connection with the
evidence showing what the deceased has
contributed to the family for support and
maintenance, the wife and children may
also show the affection the deceased entertained for them, his disposition and deportment toward them, his counsel and advice, and his care and kindly solicitude for
their welfare insofar as theRe things were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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made effective by his acts, and that the
jury may consider all these things in connection with the evidence of the amount
the deceased contributed for support, as
aforesaid, in arriving at the amount which
the widow and minor children shall receive
as compensation for the injury sustained
by them by reason of the death of the husband and father.''
And again at page 440 says :
"Whatever is allowed by the jury must
be by way of pecuniary recompense for
the loss sustained by the wife and minor
children, and must be strictly limited (1)
to what the evidence shows the deceased
contributed, and thus would probably have
continued to contribute to them in money
or other means by way of support and as
an accumulation to his estate: and (2) to
the money value of the injury suffered by
the wife and minor children by reason of
the loss of the advice, comfort and society
which they enjoyed prior to the death of
the decease-d and which would have continued for their benefit. If the evidence
is to the effect that the widow and minor
children suffered no loss upon the first
ground because the deceased provided
neither money nor other means of support,
they }:till may be entitled to something
upon the second ground, because the society of the deceased may have been a comfort and his advice of material assistance
to them. Ag1ain, a wife and children may
have lost little or nothing upon either or
both grounds, and the jury should then
compensate them only for what they have
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lost, and, in case they have lost upon both
grounds, they should receive compensation
to the extent of their loss.''
Mrs. Potter for many, many years and up to
the time of her last illness had been rendering real
and tangible 8ervice to her husband. We quote
from the testimony of the daughter :
"She didn't wait on your father?
A. Yes, she waited on my father.

Q.

Q. What did she do for him after October, 1938?
A. She kept care of his clothes,, seeing
that he was fed and dre·ssed, and he is quite
a care." (Tr. 125; Ab. 24-5).

In other words the testimony of the daughter
Jennie above was to the effect that her mother
kept house for her father up to the time of her
death. Mr. Potter, the husband, being a semiinvalid, no woman could render greater serviee.
Such services, those usual to mothers and wive~,
are of real pecuniary value difficult though it he
to place an exact dollar and cents value upon them.
No testimony was introduced, no claim was
made, for any loss of services to the children and
this element was not submitted to the jury. The
element of loss of services was limited strictly to
those suffered by the husband.
The husband and all the children were deprived
of the society and companionship of their mother
hy her death. This loss represented a real pecuniary loss to them as much as is possible or usual
in any case. The Potter family was a harmonious
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and affectionate group. There was no diseord. We
again quote from the testimony of the daughter:

Q. '"What was your mother's ability as
a housewife~ (Tr. 112; not in appellant's
Abstract).
A. She had always been an excellent
housewife.
Q. vVhat was the relationship between
your father and mother so far as .being
affectionate to each other~ (Tr. 113; Ab.
19-20).
A. Well, they have been married for
fifty -three years and they have always
been happy together.
Q. And as to companionship~
A. Well, they were always together and
they worked together in everything. There
was no disharmony in our home at all.
Q. And what had been the conduct and
attitude of your mother toward her children throughout her life and continuing
on up to the time of her death 1
A. \Vell, she was the grandest mother in
the world, I think, and she had :always
been just grand to us. She has worked
with us at all times and helped us in everything we have gone through.''
Appellant quotes at length from White v.
Shipley, 48 Utah 496; 160 Pacific 441, as being
applicable to the facts in the case at bar. ·We submit that the White case is clearly distinguishable
and in no way affects the law as we have stated it.
In the White ease the children of the deceas.ed were
not named in the complaint as beneficiaries, were
not parti~s to the :wtion, and the only mention of
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them in the entire proceeding came upon cross
examination and consisted only of the children's
names, ages, Hnd addresses. And then tlie trial
court instructed the jury that the loss of society
of the deceased to these children was to be considered by them in assessing damages. This in1Struction was held to be error and we agree, rightly
so. But the facts in the White case :are not those
of the case at bar. In the instant case the children
of Mrs. Potter are named as beneficiaries, are
parties plaintiff in the action, and their relationship with their mother w,as ver11 carefully brought
out for the jttry' s consideration. The case at bar
.is the usual one where los.s of society and pecuniary loss therefrom is shown to be a fact, not one
where out of a clear sky the jury is allowed to
speculate.
Appellant places some emphasis upon the testimony of Dr. Boorne to the effect that in his opinion Mrs. Potter would never recover from her
~1eart ailment.
In this respect we call attention
to the fact that Dr. Boorne carefully avoided stat1ng that Mrs. Potter was fatally ill. Quite on the
contrary he testified that in his opinion her condition could be made better. He stated it thus:
"I thought her condition might be improved inasmuch as she was suffering at
the time from lack of food and water . . .
I knew we could improve the sta,te of her
nutrition, which might improve her sense
of well being . . . but I doubted that she
would ever recover." (Tr. 281: Ab. 60).
It is common knowledge that a person sufferIng a heart attack seldom if ever completely recovers. But lack of complete recovery does not
mean death and it is well to keep in miU:d that Mrs.
Potter had suffered an attack similar to this one
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during l\fay of the preceding vear and had re...
covered sufficiently to render further service to
her husband and comfort to her children. err. 123;
Ab. 24).

A HOSPITAL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE
OF ITS SERVANTS R-ESULTING lN'
DEATH OF A PAYING PATIENT, NOT·WITHSTANDING THAT HOSPITAL IS
ORGANIZED AS A CHARITY AND GIVES
CHARITABLE SERVICE.
The above stated rule was laid down by this
'Court in
·
Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial
Hospital Ass'n, 89 Utah 222; 51 Pac.
(2d) 229.
And again upon second appeal in
94 Utah 460; 78 Pac. (2d) 645.
No reason exists to now change this rule for it is
soundly based and, as stated by this Court, will
soon carry the numerical weight of authority. New
Hampshire follows the rule in their most recent
decision,
Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 9
Atlantic (2d) 761, (1939).
California has very recently adopted the rule as
Ret out in the Sessions case.
Silva v. Providence Hospital of Oakland,
97 Pac. ( 2d) 798.
England v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 97 Pac. (2d) 812.
The Silva case is so similar to the case at bar boLl}
upon the facts and the law that we ·wish to call
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special attention to it. We quote from the second
paragraph of the opinion:
''The facts in the case are practically undisputed. Almost four years ago, while
the plaintiff was a patient in the hospital
and paying the amounts charged by it for
the services rendered to her, she fell and
fractured her hip by reason of the negligence of the hospital nurse in failing to
equip her bed with a side-board. The hospital concedes the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings on the issues
of negligence, but it challenges the findings and conclusions of law upon a special
defense of exemption from liability.''
Mter thoroughly examining the various
authorities and theories concerned with the question of liability of charitable organizations the
California Court concludes to follow the Sessions
cas.e and closes its opinion thus:
''This (citing the Sessions case) is not only
the modern view but the one required by
every principle of common justice. As one
Court has said: 'It is a _principle of law,
as well as morals, that men must be just
before they are generous.'
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass 'n, 191
Ala. 572; 68 So. 12; L.R.A. 1915D,
1167.
The judgment is affirmed.''
Mrs. Potter, the deceased, was a paying
patient. This fact was first admitted by the appel~
lant hospital in their original answer but later de~
nied. The facts concerned with the question of
payment were presented by stipulation and ~he
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trial court found, as a matter of law, that the deceased was a paying patient and did not submit
that matter to the jury. An examination of the
transcript and exhibits clearly supports this finding~ and we must urge the reading of the transcript from page 73 to page 89, inclusive, in order
to present the stipulation on this matter fully.
It is admitted by the pleadings and the stipulation of the parties that the appellant hospital is
a corporation of Utah engaged in the treatment,
nursing and care of the g·eneral public for pay.
(Tr. 2, 18; Ab. 2, 7). Also, that the Price First
\V ard is a separate corporation. ( Tr. 19, 72; A h.
8, 12). The deceased was a member of the Price
First ·Ward and as such was admitted to the appellant hm;;pital as what is designated as a Church
case. (Tr. 21, 84). A charge for services rendered
her was made in the sum of $55.30 by the hospital.
(Tr. 89; Ab. 14). For payment of this sum the
appellant hospital looked to the Price First "\Vard
as admittedly was the custom. (Tr. 82). And upon
!.larch 17, 1939, a payment of $10.00 was received
by the hospital from Price First Ward. There is
no merit in appellant's contention that this payment was not paid for the services rendered Mrs.
Potter for Exhibit 1, the ledger account for Mrs.
Potter, shows that the $10.00 was credited upon
71Pr a,ccount mul the balance du,e was reduced from
$55.30 to $45.30. The ledger account also contain~
the notation to ''Collect from: Ward,'' supporting
respondent's proof that payment was expected
from the Price First Ward for the s.ervices rendered Mrs. Potter. The fact that but $10.00 of the
total charges was collected does not affect the fact
of consideration for the Court will not question
1
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the adequacy of consideration. The rule as stated
in
13 Corpus Juris 365, is thus :
"So long as it is something of real value
in the eye of the law. whether or not the
consideration is adequate to the promise
is generally immaterial in the absence of
fraud.
The slightest consideration is
sufficient to support the most onerous
obligation; the inadequacy, as has been
well said, is for the parties to consider at
the time of making the agreement, and not
for the court when it is sought to be enforced."
The fact that the appellant hospital expected
and did receive compensation for the services it
rendered Mrs. Potter leaves no escape from th(\
proposition that the patient was a paying patient
as far as the hospital was concerned. The charitable undertaking came entirely from the Price
First \V ard. However, should a proper case arise
in which the question of the liability of a hospital
to a non-paying patient must be determined we
.~ubmit that the rule of the Sessions case should
be interpreted to include non-paying patients. In
the Silva case (California), above cited, a single
.Justice dissented from the prevailing opinion in
which charitable institutions were held liable for
negligent acts of their servants. We believe part
of the dissenting opinion to be worthy of note:
''I cannot agree with the prevailing opinion for two principal reasons. In the first
place, I challenge the test of exemption
from liability based on the ability of the
pati~nt to pay. A poor man is just as
much entitled to good treatment at a
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hospital as a rich one and is ju.st as much
in need of it. Compare
Robinson v. Pioche, 5 Cal. 460-1. ''
(Italics ours).
The Justice then bases his dissent upon the proposition that charitable institutions should enjoy
general immunity.
And the Minnesota Court in the Mulliner cas.e,
heretofore cited, indicates it does not wish to distinguish between paying and non-paying patients
for this Court states:
"In this case, the deceased paid for the
services he expected would be rendered,
but this may not be a controlling fact. We
do not believe that a policy of irresponsibility best suhserves the beneficient purposes for which the hospital is. maintained.
·we do not approve the public policy, which
would require the widow and children of
deceased rather than the corporation, to
suffer the loss incurred through the fault
of the corporation's employees, which
would compel the persons damag'ed to contribute the amount of their loss. to the
purposes of even the most worthy corporation. We are of the opinion that pub..
lic policy does not favor exemption from
liability.''
t

West Virginia is emphatic in its position that
shall he no penalty upon poverty, saying:

hPr~

"That such a hospital in its treatment of
a rich patient shall be held to a greater
degree of care than in its treatment of a
pauper is not to be tolerated. Certain
luxuries may be given the former which
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the latter cannot get, and this for various
reasons ; but the degree of protection from
unskilled and careless nurses must be the
same in both cases.''
Frantz Roberts v. Ohio Valley General
Hospital, 12.7 S.E. 318; 42 A.L.R.
968, citing
Powers v. Massachusetts Homoeopathic
Ho·spital, i109 Fed. 294; 65 :A.L.R.
372.
The many authorities cited by appellant to the
·effect that non~pa.ying patients cannot recover for
negligent acts of employees of a charitable institution are all from States which grant this. immunity in paying cases as well. We believe, therefore, that the reasoning of these cases is not
',applicable to the facts of the case at bar and th~
rule laid down in the Sessions cas.e. Those States
in which the rule of the Sessions case is established
indicate or hold that there can be no distinction between a paying and a non-paying patient. The
following cases are from those jurisdictions:
·Alabama:
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass 'n, 191 Ala.
572; 68 So. 4,
(paying patient, hut other Courts consider language of opinion all-inclusive).
Alabama Baptist Hospital Board v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109; 145 So. 443.
Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598; 145 So. 848.
South Florida R. R. Co. v. Price, 32 Fla.
46; 10 Ro. 638.
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Minnesota:
Mulliner v. German EYang-elical Synod,
144 Minn. 392; 175 N :W. 699.
Geiger v. Sin1pson Methodist Episcopal
Church, 17 4: :Jiinn. 389 ; 219 N. W. 463.
Oklahoma:
City of Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60;
223 Pac. 354,
where the Court said exemptions of this kind were
for the legislative and not the judicial branch of
the government, citing the Tucker (Alabama) case)
above.
Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler,
183 Okla. 454; 82 Pac. (2d) 996.
City of Pawhuska v. Black, 117 Okla.
108; 244 Pac. 1114.
As we have heretofore pointed out, California
now adheres to the rule of the Sessions. case. But
it is interesting to note that when the harsh rule
limiting liability in that jurisdiction to cases involving neglient selection of nurses and employees
was in effect" that such limited liability was a
special defense which had to be both pleaded and
proved by the charitable defendant.
Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n,
273 Pae. 580.
The appe1lant in the instant case neither pleaded
nor proved due care in its selection of employees.
We submit that the record is free. of error and
that the judgment should be affirmed.
Re·spectfully submitted,
T. D. LEWIS,
DAVID T. LEWIS,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
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